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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW involved and thereupon the general theories which have been advanced for the solution of the problem.
Domicil. Domicil plays an important role in the Anglo-American and South American systems of the conflict of laws. On the continent and in a few of the South American countries it has been supplanted by the principle of nationality. The law of domicil is invoked even in these countries, however, when the nationality of the party is unknown and under other circumstances. Suppose now that the question before a New York court is whether a citizen of the State of New York, formerly domiciled therein, has lost his New York domicil and become domiciled in France. Should the New York courts determine the question of domicil solely with reference to their own law or should they inquire into the French law of domicil? The question is of considerable practical importance because of the fact that the continental definition of domicil does not always agree with the Anglo-American. In some countries of Europe domicil denotes merely the <:enter of a man's affairs without the connotation of permanent home.
2
A similar problem might be presented with reference to England, whose rules governing domicil differ in various respects from the American law, for example, as regards the reverter doctrine and as to the capacity of a married woman to acquire a separate domicil from her husband.
The continental writers maintain with respect to the question the greatest variety of views. Some agree with the French Court of Cassation that the question of domicil involves merely a question of fact and that a conflict with respect to the definition of domicil cannot, therefore, arise. 3 Others concede that the notion of domicil is one of law and fact, but assume that the Roman conception of domicil has become the universal rule, 'See Art. 102, French Civil Code; Art. 16 , Italian Civil Code. The French call it a de facto domicil to distinguish it from a "legal" or "authorized" domiciL The latter is a preliminary step to naturalization and confers upon the foreigner the enjoyment of all civil rights. See Art. 13, Civil Code.
"The French Court of Cassation declines therefore to review the findings of the trial court with respect thereto. Cass. Oct. 22, 1900 , Clunet 1900 . The lower courts determine the question in accordance with the French notion of domicil if the party resided in France. If the residence was in another state they profess to apply the national law of the party. App. Nancy, May 8, 1875 , Sirey 1876 App. Toulouse, May 22, 1880; Sirey 1880, 2, 294 . See also App. Brussels, Jan. 18, 1888 , Dalloz 1888 In Germany it has been held by the Imperial Court that the loss of a domicil should be determined with reference to the law of such domicil. Juristische Wochenschrift 1884, 28. See ibid., 1895, 393.
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so that there are actually no differences in regard to the question.~ Those conceding that· the definitions of domicil vary in the different countries reach conclusions. which are connected more or less with their general theories concerning the conflict of laws. For example, some authors, supporting the principle of the "personality" of laws, would allow the national law of the party to govern the question. 5 Weiss 6 would allow an exception to the rule with respect to countries in which the law of doJ.?icil controls status and capacity. In such a case he sees no escape from the application of the law of the forum. Others would refer the decision to the law of the forum in all cases in which the party was a resident of the forum, and in all other cases, to his nationallaw.
7
Still others maintain that the lex fori is the only law that can furnish a solution of the problem in any case. 8 The German writers determine the question of domicil in accordance with the law of each country· in which the party may be deemed domiciled.
9
If the application of this test should result in several domicils, Niemeyer 10 would choose the one having the closest connection with the question before the court, that is,
•Bar, Private International Law (Gillespie's transl.) 112. The Roman definition of domicil is as follows: "Et in eodem) loco singulos habere domicilium non ambigitur, ubi quis larem rerumque ac fortunarum suarum summam constituit, uncle rursus non sit discessurus; si nihil avocet, uncle cum profectus est, peregrinari videtur, quo si rediit, peregrinari iam destitit." Code X, 40, 7.
•3 Weiss, Traite de droit international prive (2d ed.) 323; Valery, Manuel de droit international prive, 113; Durand, Essai de droit international prive, 373.
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generally the older domicil. Zitelmann 11 would accept the older domicil if neither of the domicils was in the state of the forum. If one of them was in such state, he would choose that domicil.
Nationality. The law governing the acquisition and loss of nationality varies greatly in the different countries, so that it often happens that a person is claimed as a citizen or subject by several governments.
12
In countries determining the capacity of parties and various other questions in the conflict of laws in accordance with the law of nationality, this condition gives rise to a serious problem. Should the law of a particular country under these circumstances adhere in its system of the conflict of laws to the principle of nationality or should it yield in such a case to that of domicil? If the law of nationality is to be retained, what law is to determine the nationality of the party for the purpose of the litigation?
Where the law of the forum claims the party as a subject this law will naturally control. Courts and writers are agreed upon this point.U But where the party has two foreign nationalities there is the greatest difference of opinion as to the one that should prevail. The only express legislative provision on the subject is to be found in the Japanese Civil Code, which provides that the nationality acquired last is to govern. Planck prefers in certain cases the law of the place of residence to that of the older domicil. Biirgerliches Gesetzbuch (3d ed.), Vol. 6, 110.
"'Bisocchi, Acquisto e perdita della nazionalita nella legislazione comparata e nel diritto internazionale, 112; 1 Sieber, Das Staatsbiirgerrecht im internationalen Verkehr 190; 1 Weiss, op. cit., 255.
'"So expressly Art. 16 of the Japanese Civil Code. In support of this proposition see also Cass. Beige, June 12, 1876, Clunet 1878, 522; A:pp. Toulouse, Jan. 26, 1876, Clunet 1877, 235; Court of First Instance of Luxembourg, Jan. 5, 1887 , Clunet 1887 Swiss Federal Tribunal, June 10, 1876 , Clunet 1876 Despagnet, op. cit., 369-370 
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relating to nationality in such a case.
15
The lower courts, however, have sometimes abandoned the principle of nationality in these cases and substituted for it the law of domicil.l 6 A number of writers would allow the law of domicil to govern whenever the domicil of the party was in one of the foreign states concerned.U Some would do so only if the foreign nationalities were acquired at the same time.
18
If they were acquired in succession some 10 would accept the nationality which was acquired last; others/ 0 the one that was acquired first. If the party had no domicil in either of the foreign states some authors would accept the nationality of the state in which the party had his residence. App. Liege, Feb. 15, 1876 , Pasicrisie, 1876 Apr. 22, 1885 , Pasicrisie, 1885 Clunet 1886, 369; App. Brussels, Dec. 1, 1884 , Pasicrisie, 1885 Clunet 1886 , 369, Feb. 17, 1905 , Revue de droit international prive, 1908 Trib. Com. Louvain, July 26, 1887 , Gazette du Palais, 1887 Trib. Com. Bruges, July 28, 1888 , Pandectes Periodiques, 1889 Trib. Com. Antwerp, Aug. 27, 1906 , Clunet 1909 Art. 36, Comm,ercial Code; Art. 1098, Civil Code; App. Milan, Dec. 11, 1888 , Clunet 1892 Cass. Turin, Apr. 26, 1881 , Foro italiano, 1881 Jan. 13, 1891 , Monitore dei tribunali 1891 La Legge 1891, 1, 519; Clunet 1891 Clunet , 1026 Cass. Rome, March 23, 1892 , Monitore, 1892 . See also Giurisprudenza sui codice civile, art. 1098 No. 324 and cases there cited; Giurisprudenza sui codice di commercia, art. 36 and cases there cited. So as to jurisdiction of courts, Cass. Turin. Feb. 9, 1884 , Monitore 1884 Oct. 27, 1905 , Monitore 1906 App. Milan Dec. 1, 1888 , Monitore 1889 , 55. "'Com. Code, Arts. 35-38. ""App. Lyons, June 27, 1867 , Dalloz 1867 App. Chambery June 8, 1877 , Dalloz 1878 App. Orleans, June 26, 1885 , Dalloz 1886 App. Aix, Nov. 23, 1908 , Dalloz 1909 Clunet 1909, 746; App. Nimes, June 15, 1900 , Dalloz, 1901 March 4, 1908 , Dallozz 1908 Dalloz 1872, 5, 111; March 30, 1889 , Gazette du Palais, 1889 App. Douai, March 25, 1886 , Dalloz 1888 App. Poitiers Nov. 4, 1886, answer would depend upon the law governing the contract. Let us assume that both New York and the foreign country are committed to the doctrine that the law of the place of contracting governs. The la'\Y" of New York says that the contract is made in Russia. The law of Russia says that the place of contracting is New York. Which law is to determine the place of contracting?
Continental writers generally determine the obligation ·of contracts in accordance with the expressed or implied intention of the parties. The place where the contract is deemed made is, therefore, at most of secondary importance. 36 Many writers deny that the rules relating to the completion of contracts by correspondence from the point of view of time can be rationally invoked for the solution of the problem from the standpoint of the conflict of laws. For these reasons the case suggested above is rarely discussed by the authors. Those that have dealt with it have, as a rule, applied the law of the forum.
37
Some writers have suggested that the lex loci should be determined in accordance with the intenGazette du Palais, 1886, 2, 907; Jan. 21, 1891 , Dalloz 1892 , 2, 249, May 14, 1901 , Dalloz 1902 Oct. 28, 1907 164 . Surville favors the common domicil in the absence of a common nationality. In the absence of a commop nationality and domicil he would apply the le:r domicilil of the party whose domicil was established in the country to which the other party belonged by nationality. In the absence of any of the above fads he would apply the law of the party who had taken a preponderating part in the negotiations. Clunet 1891, 369-371. The Institute of International Law adopted the following resolution: "If the contract has been concluded by correspondence, the le:r loci contractus shall not be taken into consideration and the law of the domicil or commercial establishment of the offeror shall be applied." 22 Annuaire de l'Institut de droit international prive, 289-292. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW tion of the parties, and, when the intention of the parties is not clear, by the judge in the light of the surrounding circumstances. 38 Law of the Place of Perfornzance. According to the law of some countries, including Germany 39 and most states of this country/ 0 the obligation of contracts is determined with reference to the law of the place of performance. Where the contract is silent regarding the place of performance such place must necessarily be determined by law. Suppose, now, that A of this country and B of Germany enter into a contract containing no express provision regarding the place of performance and that the American and German laws differ on the question where such place of performance is. If the action is brought in the United States in a state determining the rights and duties arising out of contracts by the law of the place of performance, we should have identical rules of the conflict of laws governing the case in the two countries involved, but a question would be raised regarding the law that should decide the preliminary question or point of contact, that is, what the place of performance is.
The above problem has remained practically unnoticed. Generally the assumption is made that the law of the countries concerned is identical with respect to the place of performance, but this is often erroneous in fact. The suggestion has been made also 41 that the law governing the contract should determine the question, but it is obvious that if the law of the place of performance controls the obligation of the contract in the particular system of the conflict of laws, such suggestion involves a begging of the question at issue. Kahn 42 points out that in the case under consideration only the law of the forum can furnish a solution of the preliminary problem.
Law of Place Where Tort is Contntitted. A problem similar to the one just discussed may present itself with respect to torts. The physical act causing the harm may take place in one state or country and the effect or effects resulting therefrom may occur in 38 Gemma, Propedeutica al d.iritto internazionale privato,-La cosidetta teoria delle qualificazioni, 113-114; Niemeyer, Vorschlage und Materialien zur Kod.ifikation des internationalen Privatrechts, 242.
" 'Imperial Court, Oict. 13, 1894, 34 R G 191 ; Apr. 28, 1900, 46 R G 193; May 26, 1900, 46 R G 112; A11r. 21, 1902, 51 R G 218; June 16, 1903, 55 R G 105; July 4, 1904, 14 Zeitschrift fiir internationales Privat-und Strafrecht, 285; April 26, 1907, 18 ibid., 177. 40 Beale, 23 Harvard Law Rev. 82, 194. "Gemma, op. cit., [115] [116] 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 99; Dreyfus, op. cit., 308, note 1. some other state or country or in several other states or countries. Although the law of the various countries concerned should agree upon the lex loci delicti as the rule governing torts in the conflict of laws, one of them might regard the place of the physical act as the lex loci and another, the place where the effect occurred, 43 How is the place where the tort is committed to be ascertained? Kahn 44 appears to be the only writer who has considered this problem. As in the preceding cases he finds it necessary to deter~ mine the question in accordance with the law of the forum.
Movable or immovable property. The law may regard movable property for certain purposes as immovable property. Rights in realty may be assimilated by law either to immovable or to movable property. Artificial categories may thus be created with respect to which the law of the situs of the property, the law of the state governing the particular juridical relationship, and the law of the forum may differ. The question thus presents itself: What law shall determine the character of the property interest in question?
The statement is generally made that the questions must be determined by the law of the situs of the property.
45
Some of the leading writers contend, however, that this rule is incorrect and that the law governing the particular juridical relationship should control. According to these writers the law of the situs should govern with respect to property rights as such, but if the question arises in connection with the law of succession, matrimonial prop-. erty, or contracts, it should be determined by the rule applicable in the conflict of laws to succession, matrimonial property or "'Zitelmann points out that the place where a wrongful act is committed may be determined differently in criminal law and in the law of torts. 
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46
Niemeyer 47 suggests, however, that such rule must yield to the law of the situs whenever the latter is mandatory. Kahn 48 insists upon the fact that if the application of the law of one state or country or that of another depends upon the character of the property as movable or immovable, the preliminary question regarding the character of such property must, for want of any other law that can control, depend upon the law of the forum.
Substance or Procedure. Anglo-American courts regard the statute of limitations as belonging to procedure. Elsewhere the question is generally deemed to affect the substance. 49 Suppose, now, that a contract is made in France, under the law of which the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the suit is brought in New York, under the law of which the action is not barred. Will the law governing the contract, that is French law, or the law of the forum determine the question whether the action can be maintained?
So far as the continental writers have discussed this problem they have supported the law of the forum.
50
Substance, Capacity or Porn~. The following cases have been much discussed in connection with the conflict of qualifications.
(1) A and B, subjects of the state of X and domiciled in such state, make in the state of Y a joint will which conforms to the law of the state of Y. Is the will valid in the state of X if the law of the state of X declares joint wills to be void? We may assume (a) that the law of the state of Y regards the matter as one of form and the law of the state of X, as one going to the substance or to capacity; (b) that the law of the state of Y regards it as one of substance or capacity and the law of the state of X as one of form. 
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Is the will valid in the state of Z if both the states of X and Y regard the question as one of form, but the law of the state of Z looks upon it as one of substance or capacity? Bartint> 2 would decide the above cases in accordance with the law of the forum. DienaGa would apply the law of the forum to the cases presented in the first paragraph and the law of the states of X and Y to the case mentioned in the last paragraph.
(2) The law of X forbids its subjects to execute a holographic will irrespective of the place of execution. 1887, 5, 7; Clunet 1887 , 495, Feb. 10, 1892 , Pasicrisie 1892 , 3, 139. France: Trib. civ. Seine, Aug. 13, 1903 , Clunet 1904 Trib. civ. Term.onde, March 24, 1907 , Clunet 1908 , 885. Holland: Trib. Amsterdam, July 6, 1885 , Clunet 1889 Feb. 15, 1901 , Clunet 1903 Weekblad von het Recht, no. 7624 
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it is sometimes exceedingly difficult to know whether the rights of the surviving widow are given to her as a result of the matrimonial property regime or as a right of succession. Where there has been a change of domicil or nationality after the celebration of the marriage, the question whether the personal law at the time of the marriage or at the time of death will determine her rights may depend, therefore, upon this preliminary question.
The writers discussing this subject are inclined to make a distinction between the cases which are connected with the law of the forum by reason of the decedent's nationality or domicil and the cases where the law of the forum has no such connection with the subject. In the former situation Catellani 63 would apply the law governing the succession, and in the second, the "competent" law. Bartin 64 contends in favor of the law of the forum in both cases.
Civil or Commercial Acts. In continental countries special rules are often applicable to "commercial acts." This is true not only from the standpoint of the strictly internal law but also from that of the conflict of laws. 65 As the definition of a "commercial" act varies, the problem is whether the preliminary question as to what constitutes such act is to be determined by the strictly local law of the forum or whether the qualification of the foreign law shall be adopted.
Practically all are agreed that the lex fori will control with respect to the character of an act as commercial or civil if the ultimate question relates to the jurisdiction of courts. 
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reference to the intention of the parties, and still others, 69 the law of the _forum.
The above are the principal questions which have been considered by the continental writers in connection with the problem of qualifications. Let us consider now the theories that have been proposed for the solution of the general problem.
General Theories
Bartin. Of the various attempts to formulate a general theory for the solution of the problems above outlined Bartin's "theory of qualifications" was the first to attract general attention. This writer maintains that whenever the application of the· internal law of the forum or that of another country depends upon the nature of a particular juridical relationship, it is the law of the forum which must decide what the nature of the relationship is. The reasoning by which this conclusion is reached is tlie following. Barton starts with the fundamental proposition that the law of the forum in authorizing the application of foreign law voluntarily restricts its own sovereignty. When the judge of the forum is directed, therefore, to apply foreign law to a particular legal institution or relationship, it is evident that the extent of the limitation upon the sovereignty of the former must be measured by the notion which the law of the forum entertains of such institution or relationship. A state cannot possibly be deemed to have entrusted the foreign law with the duty of determining which juridical relationships belong and which do not belong to the institution which the law of the forum intended to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign law. If it did so the law of the forum would not define the extent of its obligation with reference to the foreign sovereignty as it has a right to do, for it would be the foreign law-the foreign sovereignty-that would in reality determine in such a case the extent of such obligation. By giving to the institution a wider meaning than it has under the law of the forum the foreign law would be able to extend the obligation indefinitely. The result would be that the law of the forum would no longer be master in its own home.
70
Bartin would apply the law of the forum also in the case where the juridical relationship as such had in its origin no connection with the law of the forum, and the foreign country or countries with which it was so connected qualify it in a different manner. He would do so without regard to the fact whether or not the qualification of one of the foreign laws agrees with the qualification of the forum. He is led to this conclusion through the following process of reasoning. The system of qualifications of the law of the forum is the necessary complement of the system of private international law which the law of the forum has adopted. Both are expressions of its idea concerning its own sovereignty and the limitation thereon which it feels bound to admit. As there is no authority other than that of the state which has power to define the sovereignty of such state and the extent to which the international community of nations limits its sovereignty and its laws enacted thereunder, each state is invested in the nature of things with the power to fix the extent itself, and in doing so it draws its inspiration necessarily not from the arbitrary counsels of comity but from the idea it entertains of sovereignty in general, including its own sovereignty. This notion of sovereignty on which this system of private international law rests together with its system of qualifications, which is the necessary complement thereto, is the expression of its conception of the requirements of international justice. It follows, therefore, that it must apply the same notion and everything depending thereon to the other states as well as to itself. When the judge has before him, therefore, two different qualifications of the same legal relationship, that is, two different expressions of sovereignty, he must naturally follow exclusively the qualification which results from his own notion of sovereignty. This notion the forum has constructed in an abstract, impersonal and disinterested manner, so that it may serve within its own territory for the purpose of separating the domain of its own law from the domain of the foreign law, as well as separating the domain of one foreign law from that of anotherY· To the rule that the law of the forum must qualify all juridical relationships Bartin will recognize two exceptions : ( 1) With respect to the determination of a thing as movable or immovable he would apply the law of the situs, not because such law has sovereign authority over the soil but because it subserves best the security of transactions affecting property ; the contract is made by correspondence, not with reference to the law of the forum but with reference to that law applicable to the case which would postpone its formation longest.
73
, A number of writers agree in general with Bartin's theory. 74 Donnedieu de Vabres 75 takes issue, however, with Bartin's view that the application of foreign law by the law of the forum involves a limitation of its own sovereignty. This writer maintains that an appropriation of the foreign law that seems best to the forum constitutes an exercise of its own sovereignty and that it would be an abdication of such sovereignty if the forum should consult another qualification than its own.
Buzzatti. Originally Buzzatti agreed with Bartin only to the extent of holding that the determination of domicil and perhaps certain other points of contact must be governed by the law of the forum. As regards the other problems he felt that the cases discussed by Bartin resulted not so much from a difference in the laws of the different countries as from an erroneous interpretation and application of such laws.
76
Buzzatti has, however, modified his opinion since the time of the publication of his original article on the subject, so that his views coincide today more nearly with those expressed by Bartin. 77 Diena. Where the conflict in qualification is between the law of the forum and that of a foreign system Diena would agree with Bartin's conclusion. But where the only connection of the case with the law of the forum is the fact that suit is brought there Diena would not apply the qualification of the law of the forum whenever the foreign systems agree among themselves on the qualification of the legal transaction. In this case he would accept the common foreign qualification. He found it impossible, however, to apply this principle to the case of double nationality when the law of the forum is disinterested. In this case he would abandon the rule of nationality and substitute for it that of domiciJ.8 1 Despagnet. Despagnet has advanced the proposition that the law governing the legal relationship must control also its qualification. His argument in support of this conclusion is the following. When a judge, drawing his inspiration from his own law and the principles of private international law, decides that a foreign law should be applied to a particular juridical relationship, he must be understood as applying such law so far as it organizes and regulates such relationship. Now the first point that attracts the attention of the legislator and the first thing determined by him is the nature or qualification of the relationship which he regulates. To disregard his decision in this respect is tantamount to a nonapplication of the law to which the juridical relationship in question was on principle subject. If the national law has made a certain question one of capacity, can it be said that if the question is converted into one of form by the law of the forum the law which should govern the capacity of individuals has been appiled? No! The very principle has been violated. What is of capital importance and what produces all subsequent juridical consequences is precisely the qualification to be given to a juridical relationship and it is a flagrant contradiction in fact to import the qualification of the forum and at the same time to pretend that one is following the foreign law. Take the classical example-Article 3, Paragraph 3, of the French Civil Code, according to which the capacity of foreigners is regulated by the national law. This article is manifestly violated if we should say that the prohibition to make a will in holographic form which exists in Holland with respect to Dutch subjects is a question of form according to the French legislation, when the national law of the Dutch subject has made of it '"30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher, 76, 91, 99. 81 Ibid., 69.
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a question of capacity. It seems evident that the first consequence resulting from the adoption of a law for the regulation of a certain relationship is the necessity of adopting also the nature which it attributes to it and the qualification which it gives to the relationship.
82
According to Despaguet, therefore, a judge must accept the qualification adopted. by the foreign law, in order to apply the latter in conformity with the rules of private international law sanctioned by his own law. This view is shared on principle by several other writers.
83
Gemma. According to this writer the principles of the conflict of laws should not be deduced from the function of the state and of the judge, but the norms for a state and judge should be deduced on the basis of the conflict of la\VS. Gemma would separate the juridical relations and institutions from the positive legislations of the various states, so that their function may be considered without bias with reference to the requirements of international life. The judge should, therefore, appreciate the qualification of legal transactions solely with reference to that law which is most favorable to the development of the relationship itself in its extraterritorial aspect. According to Gemma the will of a Dutch subject executed in the holographic form in a cotintry in which such wills are permitted should be recognized by the courts of other countries, not because the law of the forum regards the question as one of form (Bartin), nor because the national law governing in the system of the conflict of laws of the forum regards it as a question of capacity (Despaguet), but because a proper international order requires that persons abroad should be able to execute wills in as simple a form as possible and the holographic will best answer this requirement. The judge should have in mind the international principles and not those of the forum. Otherwise a real system of private international law can never be built up.
84
Jitta. This author rejects all mechanical applieation of the lex fori, the lex domicilii, the lex rei sitG!, the lex loci contractus, etc., and inquires always what are the reasonable requirements of international social life in the particular case. If a juridical relationship belongs to a particular local sphere he will apply the law of that sphere, including its qualification. The question whether property is inovable or immovable or whether a particular indi- vidual is a trader would be decided, therefore, in accordance with this principle by the law of the situs 85 or by the law of the place where the business was carried on. If the juridical relationship belongs to international social life, as for example, a contract having direct -connection with several countries or states, the rule to be applied would be the "international-common" rule, if such can be found, and if none exists, the reasonable principles of international sociallife. 86 It is apparent that in a system like this the conflict of qualifications presents no special problem and coincides in all cases with the general problem of the choice of law.
English and American Law
There is scarcely any discussion of the problem of the conflict of qualifications in the decisions of the English and American courts or by the Anglo-American text writers. The general attitude of the Anglo-American law with reference to the problem appears, however, to be clear, and with reference to some lines of cases a solution is clearly established by authority.
Movable and immovable property. The law of the situs controls the question whether property or an interest therein is to be regarded as movable or immovable property. This question was clearly decided in Johnstone v. Baker, 87 where it was held that a Scotch heritable bond, that is a mortgage deed on Scotch realty, which was in the possession of an English testator, being regarded by Scotch law as an integral part of the realty, would be deemed real estate in England for the purpose of descent. English law was held to control as the le:c rei sitce and not as the le:c fori in other cases also in which the situs of the land was in England. Chatfield v. Berchtoldf8 8 raised the question whether a rent charge pur outre vie issuing out of English land, owned by a person domiciled in Hungary, was liable to legacy duty as personal estate under the English statutes, which make estates pur outre vie applicable as personal estate in the hands of an executor and administrator. It was assumed throughout the case that the English law as the law of the situs would determine the real or personal nature of the interest in question. 265 held that the validity of a testamentary disposition of an English leasehold was governed by the law of England as the law of the situs, and not by that of the testator's domicil. The same principle was applied to the devolution of a leasehold in case of intestate succession in Dttncan v. Lawson.
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In the same way, the character of a mortgage on realty as movable or immovable property has been determined by the law of the situs.
91
Domicil. The English courts have been guided in the determination of domicil exclusively by English law and have paid no attention whatever to the foreign law. The attitude of the English law is well expressed by the Master of Rolls, Sir Nathaniel Lindley, in the case of In re Martin, in which the learned judge says : 92 "The domicil of the testatrix must be determined by the English Court of Probate according to those legal principles applicable to domicil which are recognised in this country and are part of its law. Until the question of the domicil of the testatrix at the time of her death is determined, the Court of Probate cannot tell what law of what country has to be applied. The testatrix was a Frenchwoman, but it would be -contrary to sound principle to determine her domicil at her death by the evidence of French legal experts. The preliminary question, by what law is the will to be governed, must depend in an English Court on the view that Court takes of the domicil of the testatrix when she died. If authority for these statements is wanted, it will be found in Bremer v. Freeman, Doglioni v. Crispin, and In re Trufort. In each of the last two cases a foreign Court had determined the domicil, and the English Court had also to determine it, and did determine it to be the same as that determined by the foreign Court. But, as I understand those cases, the English Court satisfied itself as to the domicil in the English sense of the term, and did not simply adopt the foreigu decisions. The course universally followed when domicil has to be decided by the Courts of this country proceeds upon the principles to which I have alluded."
The only English case suggesting a different proposition is that of In re Joh11,son. 93 In that case Justice Fanvell expressed the opinion that an English woman could acquire no domicil in Baden, although she resided permanently in the grand-duchy because the law of Baden determined the question before the court by the law of nationality and paid no regard to that of domicil. "No change is effectual," said the learned judge, "unless the factum is proved, and the factum cannot exist in a country where the law refuses to recognize it. The result is that this court must conclude that a domicil of choice, ineffectual to create any rights and liabilities governing the distribution of movables in the country supposed to have been chosen, is for this purpose no domicil at all, and that the propositus, therefore, is left with his domicil of origin unaffected. The Baden courts would in effect have disavowed him and disclaimed jurisdiction. This appears to me to be the logical result of the application of our rules respecting domicil and to be in accordance with justice." 94 Westlake 95 has given his approval to the above reasoning. "On the main point," he says, "the judgment, as well as the reasoning which has been quoted from it, was in accordance with the doctrine which I have advocated." Dicey 96 is of the opinion that all that Westlake probably meant to say was that the legal effects of domicil were to be determined solely with regard to the foreign law and without reference to the legal effect of domicil under the law of the forum. This thought is expressed by Westlake in another place where he says that "no one can acquire a personal law in the teeth of that law itsel£."
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In other words, the English judge should not apply the foreign law if it does not want to be applied. This is in accordance with Westlake's general view concerning the application of foreign law, for Westlake supports the renvoi theory in the sense of the "desistement" or mutual disclaimer of jurisdiction theory.
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As Farwell in the second line of reasoning in rn re Johnson employed the renvoi proper reasoning which westlake disapproves, the latter preferred to accept the learned judge's first argument.
It is obvious, however, that Farwell was in error when he assumed that the Baden law refused to recognize the factum of domicil. There is no doubt whatever that Miss Johnson was domiciled in Baden according to Baden law. The Baden courts would take jurisdiction and distribute the property left by her in Baden, but such distribution would be made in accordance with the rule of the conflict of laws then established in Baden, namely, the decedent's national law. 
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The decision of In re Joh11son was followed by In re Bowes, 99 without any written opinion.
Relying upon the above cases Hibbert 100 states the following two propositions as existing English law: ( 1) The law of the locality in question must recognize that domicil results from the party's presence within its territory; (2) The requirements, if any, for the acquisition of a domicil, imposed by the law of the locality in which the party permanently resides must have been complied with. It is submitted, however, that there is no warrant for the conclusions just stated, for the conflict in the cases relied upon by Hibbert turns actually upon a difference in the ru1es of the conflict of laws and not upon a difference in the conception of domicil. So far as the case of In re Johnson may hold by way of implication that a domicil Ca.nnot be establi:>hed iri a country without a compliance with the rules of such state relating to domicil, it is contrary to the established law of England.
In the United States there are no cases containing any such suggestions regarding domicil as those found in In re J ohns01~. On the contrary, there are a number of decisions showing that a domicil may be established in another state or in a foreign country without reference to the notion of domicil in the law of such state or country. 101 The case of In re Colburn's Estate 102 is no exception to the rule. In that case the Supreme Court of Iowa decided in favor of an Iowa domicil, but in so doing referred to the Oklahoma "business domicil" statute. Such reference did not, however, necessarily involve the assumption that the Oklahoma law would be controlling on the issue of domicil, but rather that the statute in question while purporting to impose an Oklahoma domicil in certain cases in fact merely prescribed the devolution of local property. The cases in general show clearly that the question of domicil is to be decided by reference to the "general" or international law as incorporated into the law of the forum and not by reference to any foreign jurisdiction.
Lez loci contractus. No English or American cases have been found which have raised the question whether the lez loci contractus of a contract made by correspondence should be determined .. (1906) 
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by the law of the forum or by the law of some other state. In the cases raising the question the foreign law was either assumed to be identical with that of the forum with respect to the place where the contract was made, or the question was held to depend upon the intention of the parties/ 03 so that it was not necessary to consider the question under discussion. There would appear to be no doubt, however, that the law of the forum controls.
Capacity or form. This question was raised in Ogden v. Ogden. 104 A Frenchman, domiciled in France, married an Englishwoman in England without the consent of his parents, which consent was required by French law, though not by English law. He subsequently obtained a decree of nullity in France for want of such consent. The woman thereupon married again. On discovering the existence of the first marriage her husband sued for divorce in England on the ground of bigamy. The Court of Appeal decided in his favor on the ground that the French decision of nullity was void, being contrary to the English rules of the conflict of laws, namely, that the consent of parents is a matter of formality and subject therefore to the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated.
In view of the above cases it may be asserted that according to Anglo-American law the qualification of legal transactions as well as the definitions of "domicil," "the law of the place of contracting," and of the other "points of contact" are governed in general by the strictly internal law of the forum, the principal exception to the ruie being that the character of property as movable or immovable is controlled by the law of the situs. This conclusion is also the only one that is consistent with the Anglo-American theory of the conflict of laws.
Anglo-American law agrees thus in substance with the conclusion reached by Bartin and Kahn. The point at issue between the foreign writers is nothing less than a fundamental difference in their conception of the conflict of laws. Bartin and Kahn are nationalists in their viewpoint while Despagnet and Gemma are internationalists. As the difference between these schools may be found in some of the most recent treatises on the conflict of laws in English 105 only a few words need be said concerning them in this place. Both nationalists and internationalists differ among themselves. A common characteristic of all internationalists is their position that the rules of the conflict of laws are dictated to the individual states, from without by some species of international law. According to them there is but a single system of the conflict of laws, the rules of which are binding for purely international reasons. The nationalists are agreed, on the other hand, that the rules of the conflict of laws form a part of the national law of each state and that there are, therefore, as many systems of the conflict of laws as there are independent states. Given this difference in their point of view it is natural that the internationalists should attempt to find some "international" solution for the problem of qualifications, and that the nationalists should be content to solve it with reference to the law of each state.
That the international theory is idealistic and not in accord with reality is obvious. International law has not furnished the existing rules of the conflict of laws; nor does it impose to-day in this respect upon the nations any far-reaching obligations. Indeed, Anglo-American writers and the nationalists in general are in the habit of asserting that international law leaves the different nations absolutely free in regard to the adoption of their rules of the conflict of laws, and that they may, if they desire, adjudicate all cases in accordance with their own rules' of internal law.
106 This position, however, qmnot be maintained, for there is a.well established rule of internart:ionallaw which forbids a fundamental denial of justice to aliens.
107 We must agree also with Kahn 108 that no state is authorized at the present development of ' 00 "lt foilows from the independence of each state within its own borders that it might without contravening any .principles of international law regulate every set of circumstances which cails for decision exclusively by its own law." Hoiland, Jurisprudence (lOth ed.) 402. To the same effect, Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), 25; Wheaton, International Law (9th ed.) 133-134; Woolsey, International law (6th ed.) 102-109; Baty, op. cit. 9; Hail, International law (8th ed.) 51; Lawrence, International law (4th ed.) 246; Twiss, Law of Nations, new ed., 261. The continental writers hold that the exclusion of ail foreign law would be regarded today as a violation of international duty. Bluntschli, Das modeme Volkerrecht, 27-28; Diena, Principi di diritto intemazionale, 23; Kahn, 40 Jhering's Jahrbuche~ 40.
wBorchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 13, 178, [196] [197] [198] [199] 330 et seq.
""40 Jhering•s J ahrbUcher, 40. Kahn is inclined to add to the above some special roles, for example, that the law of the situs controls as to property rights in immovables and that a state is not authorized to extend its roles governing domestic relations and the law of inheritance to persons temporarily within the state. These rules having been foilowed consistently by the great majority of states, a deviation therefrom would, according to Kahn, constitute a breach of an international legal duty. Ibid 41-42. COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW international relations to exclude the application of foreign law altogether or to act arbitrarily in the application of its rules of the conflict of laws. Suppose, for example, that the state of X should debar from local recognition all marriages except those consummated within its territory and thC!Jt an American husband and wife, who had taken up their residence in the state of X, should be prosecuted for illicit relations. Or suppose that the state of X should admit alien residents and then refuse recognition to titles to personal property acquired under foreign law. Can _there be any doubt, if the government of the United States should file a protest against such "outrageous" legislC~Jtion for the protection of American citizens that international law would support its claim?
While the existence of external restraint cannot, therefore, be denied altogether, the fact remains nevertheless that up to the present time, barring treaty provisions and such genera~ principles of international law as there may be which debar the local sovereign from adopting rules of conflict drastically oppressive, the national legislator or the courts of a state can adopt any rules of the conflict of laws whatever. The assertion on the part of the AngloAmerican courts and of the jurists representing the nationalistic theory of the conflict of laws that the extent of the application of foreign law in a given state depends, with the above reservations, upon the consent of such states is based, therefore, upon fact.
Assuming, then, that .the international theory of the conflict of laws rests almost wholly upon fiction let us consider briefly the Anglo-American theory and its relation to the problem of qualifications. Anglo-American courts and writers, following Huber's usage, frequently say that the application of foreign law rests upon "comity." Continental writers take strong exception to this viewpoint on the mistaken assumption that comity connotes arbitrary conduct and the absence of the idea of justice.
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In fact it ""The foreign writers of today are practically unanimous in condemning the theory of comity. See, however, Torres Campos, Elementos de derecho internacional privado, (4th ed.) 108; Aubry, Clunet 1901, 664. Bustamante says concerning comity:
"Comity is a pretext for the evasion of the consequences of a strict territorial law. After the notion of such law is denied, it would be idle to combat it, for it becomes unnecessary. But it may not be amiss to observe that in its obscure and little defined concept, interest, courtesy, and reciprocity, ideas so important for the history of law, play a part . . . The name of science cannot be given to them, nor can a practical and useful system be based upon them. They authorize simply concessions ungoverned by rule, the supposed independence of a state consisting in an adjustment of its conduct to that followed by other states, resulting is fully recognized in England and in this country, as well as on the continent, that the application of foreign law results from the dictates of justice and from the mutual convenience of nations as understood and applied by the courts of the forum.U 0 Speaking generally, it may be said that Anglo-American law still accepts the maxims first formulated by Huber regarding the basis of the conflict of laws. These maxims are the following ; 111 " ( 1) The laws of each state have force within the limits of that government and bind all subject to it, but not beyond.
" (2) All persons within the limits of a government, whether ultimately in a real isolation between the people of the different countries, and in making of courtesy and reciprocity a system of reprisal, instead of a furtherance of juridicial relations." Tratado de derecho internacional privado, 456. The key to the continental point of view may be found in the fact that the word "comity'' on the continent is regarded as opposed to "justice." The plain truth is, of course, that our courts are guided in the application of foreign law by the same sense of duty as they are in the application of purely interuallaw. Concerning the subject see more fully 13 Illinois Law L. Rev. 396-401; Wigmore, Celebration Legal Essays, 220-225. =story says : ' "It has been thought by some jurists that the term comity is not sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws when they are not prejudicial to their own rights and interests. And it has been suggested that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; that it is not so much a matter of comity or courtesy as a matter of paramount moral duty. Now assuming that such a moral duty does exist, it is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity, and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and the extent of the duty, but of the occasions on which its e.xereise may be justly demanded. And certainly there can be no pretence to say that any foreign nation has a right to require the full recognition and execution of its own laws in other territories, when those laws are deemed oppressive or injuries to the rights or interests of the inhabitants of the latter, or when their moral character is questionable, or their provisions are impolitic or unjust. . . . "The true foundation on which the administration of international law must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return . . :
"There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase 'coQlity of nations,' but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another. It is derived alto~ether from the voluntary consent of the latter, and is inadmissible when tt is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial to its interests. In the silence of any positive rule affirming or denying or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their government, unless they are repugnant to its policy or prejudicial to its interests. It is not comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of the municipal law are ascertained and guided." Op. cit., 32, 33, 35. nu 'Praclcct." pt. 2, bk 1, tit. 3, n. 2. they live there permanently or temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereo£.
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"(3) Sovereigns will so act by way of comity that rights· acquired within the limits of a government retain their force everywhere so far as they do not cause prejudice to the power or rights of such government or of its subjects." These maxims were approved by Story.
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Since Story the doctrine of the territoriality of laws has been regarded as the foundation upon which the Anglo-American system of the conflict of laws rests.
Holland 114 has called attention to the fact that Anglo-American courts in reality never enforce foreign laws but rights acquired under such laws. He says that what really happens when a law seems to obtain extraterritorial effect is that "rights created and defined by foreign law obtain recognition by the domestic tribunal." Dicey 115 and Beale accept this view and the latter 116 asserts that the common law has worked out indigenously a theory of "vested rights. " "The question whether a contract is valid, that is, whether to the agreement of the parties the law has annexed an obligation to perform its terms, can on general principles ( § 14) be determined by no other law than that which applies to the acts, that is, by the law of the place of contracting. If the law at that place annexes an obligation to the acts of the parties, the promisee has a legal right which no other law has power to take away except as a result of new acts which change it ( § 4). If on the other hand the law of the place where the agreement is made annexes no legal obligation to it, there is no other law which has power to do so." 119 :!Wfhe words "are to be deemed subjects thereof" are understood today as meaning "are to be deemed subject to its jurisdiction". mop. cit., sec. 20. mop. cit., 411. Cf. Kahn, 30 Jhering's Jahrbiicher 28. ""Op. cit., 11, 26; 6 Law Quarterly Rev. 10; 7 ibid. 114. ""Op. cit., 105. 117 For a criticism of the theory of vested rights see Wachter, 25 Archiv fiir die civilistische Praxis, 2 et seq.
""Summary, sec. I.
"If the law of the place where the parties act refuses legal validity to their acts, it is impossible to see on what principle some other law may nevertheless give their acts validity. . . . "In all these cases the matter must, it seems, be determined theoretically by the law governing the transaction, i. e., the law of the place where the parties act in making their agreement. If by that law their acts have no legal efficacy, then no other state can give them greater effect. If by the law of that state their acts created a binding obligation upon the parties, then the parties who have acted under that law must be bound by it. . . . "This doctrine gives full scope to the territoriality of law, and enables each sovereign to regulate acts of agreement done in his own territory." 120 Beale's theory appears to be that there is a territorial law exclusively applicable to a particular group of fact~ which must prevail in determining legal consequences. Several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States lend support to the same doctrine. In Slaver v. Mexican National R. R. Co., 121 Mr. Justice Holmes says:
_ "As Texas has statutes which give an action for wrongfully causing death, of course there is no general objection of policy to enforcing such a liability there, although it arose in another jurisdiction. 122 But when such a liability is enforced in a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the wrongful act, obviously that does not mean that the act in any degree is subject to the lex fori, -with regard to either its quality or its consequences. On the other hand, it equally little means that the law of the place of the act is operative outside its own territory. The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be found. 123 But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation/ 24 but equally determines its extent."
12
:;
'""23 Harvard Law Rev., 267, 268, 271. ""(1904) Notwithstanding these statements by such eminent authorities, it is submitted that while the theory that a particular territorial law is exclusively applicable to a particular set of operative facts may be established in this country as a matter of constitutional law it cannot be accepted analytically as a sound basis for the conflict of laws. Where all the operative facts occur in a single state it may be conceded that as a matter of expediency the rights of the parties should be determined ordinarily in accordance with the law of such state. But if the forum sees fit it may adopt another rule.
Where the operative facts occur in or affect more than one state, there is much greater difficulty in selecting the governing rule. Generally speaking Anglo-American law will incorporate the law of some particular foreign state. It will select at times the law of the place where the act was done or was to be performed; at other times the law of the situs of the property and not of the place of acting; at other times still it will choose neither the law of the place of acting nor that of the situs of the property but the law of the domicil. Where a contract is entered into through an agent, it will bind the principal in accordance with the law of the place where the agent acts, although the principal was never in the latter state and he had no capacity under the law of the state in which he was domiciled and in which he appointed the agent. Sometimes a legal transaction will be sustained if it conforms to the law of one of several states.
That there is no logical necessity for the application of any particular rule selected by Anglo-American law is seen from the fact that different rules with respect to the same set of facts often prevail in foreign countries; Nor can our rules of the conflict of laws be explained by any theory of "territoriality," other than the general doctrine that the law of the forum selects the rules which shall controJ.1
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In fact, the only answer that can be given to the question why the common law has chosen a particular rule to govern in the conflict of laws or in any other branch of law is that it has seemed to the forum sound policy to do so.
That the English courts have not felt bound to attach the same legal consequences to the foreign operative facts, as is done by the law of the foreign state, appears clearly from Machado v. Fontes 121 and other English cases. In the former case the publication of a '"'See (1918) 27 Yale Law Journal 816: (1920) Yale Law Tournai. The confusion caused by the use of the word ~'territorial" in different senses has been admirably shown by Aubry, Clunet, 1900, 694; 1901 , 254, 263. m(1897 When Anglo-American courts enforce a judgment from a continental country for the payment of money. they are in fact creating new rights, for in continental law a judgment entitles the party to execution, but does not constitute as it does in England and in this country a new cause of action.
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Speaking of the enforcement of judgments in general Cook says: "This clearly is a loose and technically erroneous way of putting the matter. What we ought to say is, that the common law of England and of each of the American states attaches to foreign judgments which comply with certain conditions the legal consequences described in our law by the term debt. The action brought in a common law jurisdiction is for ·the purpose of enforcing or vindicating that common law debt, not the foreign judgment. The latter is merely one of a set of operative facts which according to the principles of the common law result in a debt. Similarly, where a common law court permits an action of debt to be brought upon a chancery decree for the payment of money the common law court does not enforce the chancery decree in any way. It merely treats the latter as an operative fact which results in a common law debt, for the non-payment of which the common law court will give relief."
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Hohfeld 131 entertained the same view and made it the basis of his course on the conflict of laws both at Leland Stanford and at Yale. His position was that the courts of a sovereign state may attach any legal consequences whatever to any state of facts, including acts done in foreign countries. Cook makes in this regard the following observations : 132 "Aside from some existing system of positive law-constitutional, statutory, or judge-made-it seems clear that there is no inherent reason why the law of any sovereign nation-England, "" (1899) by English courts, be held to attach to a given state of facts, if in any way the English court is presented with a case involving them. Suppose, for example, that an English statute should provide that any person whatsoever who, under the circumstances described in the statute, injured any other person anywhere in the world, should be deemed guilty of a tort and that if he ever came into England or owned any property there he should be subject to suit and damages assessed in a prescribed manner : surely the English courts would be bound to apply the statute to all cases coming within its scope. Clearly, also, they could not enforce the statute against persons committing the acts in question outside the jurisdiction so long as these persons both remained outside and had no property within the jurisdiction. To describe this &1tuation in appropriate legal terminology must we not say that such a statute would as a matter of substantive law create primary rights in every person in the world to have all other persons refrain from the described conduct, and that when anyone was guilty of those acts anywhere a secondary English right to damages would arise? This right could not, of course, be enforced so long as the tortfeasor both remained outside of England and had no property there; but this is equally true where the tort is committed in England and the tortfeasor before action is brought, or even after it has been brought, leaves that jurisdiction and has no property within the same. That the law of England does not in fact attempt to go so far as in the case just put does not, then, show any inherent lack of power on the part of the English legislature or courts, but merely that they have refrained from establishing such a system for other reasons."
As long as the Anglo-American notion of law is based upon the existence of physical force on the part of organized society, 133 ""The continental writers are very much opposed to the Anglo-American conception of law. Law to them "is the direct consciousness, however produced, of a binding rule. . . . If it is the common consciousness of the nation, we have municipal or state law, iu its various branches. If it is the common consciousness of the civilized world, it may take various forms, which may all be classed as supra-national. It may regard the relations of States to one another; or it may regard the relations of individuals to one another." . . .
"Still, whichever of these varying schools we side with, we shall find that the content of the common consciousness which they all postulate is very meagre indeed. In fact, there is no such common sense of what is binding in private relations which have an international side.
"'We must, nevertheless, remember that it is quite possible that such common consciousness might exist, and that it is at any rate held by
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all legal relations, including rights, duties, privileges, no-rights, powers, liabilities, immunities and disabilities must necessarily have reference to some particular territorial law. Each organized society, by virtue of its existence as a sovereign, is obliged to define for itself what rights, duties, privileges, etc., shall attach to the operative facts which may be presented for determination to its judicial or executive agents, without directions or suggestions from the organized society withiq whose territory those facts may have occurred. Whether the operative facts happened wholly within its territory or partly or wholly without such territory can.._ not make any difference. "Rights" 134 being the correlatives of "duties" for the non-performance of which organized society will inflict disagreeable consequences upon the person owing the duties, it is impossible, of course, to recognize that a party has a legal right in a given state if there are no remedies available in such state for its enforcement.
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But is the power of the forum to attach legal consequences to acts done in other countries not limited by international law? "Of course some other sovereign nation may object," says Cook, "on the ground that 'international law' is being violated, or on any other grounds it chooses to assert. The United States, for example, did this successfully in the Ctttting Case/ 36 in which Mexico claimed the right to punish an American citizen for acts done in the United States. It can hardly be asserted, however, that Mexican law was not law in Mexico, i. e., binding on the Mexican courts. If from the present war there emerges a real League of Nations with power to enforce its decrees, a different legal situation may result."
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A sovereign state has, so far as its judicial or administrative agents are concerned, clearly the power to enforce any ru1es it pleases. Having this power to impose its will it may, of course, prescribe rules in contravention of international law.
"If the legislature of a particular country," says Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, "should think fit by express enactment to render foreigners subject to its law with reference to offences committed beyond the limits of its territory, it would be incumbent on the courts of such country to give effect to such enactment, leaving it to the state to settle the question of international law with the governments of other nations." 138 Indeed, in this country the courts are bound by the Constitution of the United States to enforce the provisions of a federal statute which conflict with the express terms of a prior treaty.
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A discrepancy between the municipal law and the international obligation of a state may impose upon the latter a duty to indemnify the party whose rights under international law have been violated, but cannot lead to a reversal of the actual decision of the case by the courts. So far as private rights are concerned there would appear to be no exception to or qualification of the above rule. In the domain of public law 140 it is possible that an alien convicted 1 '"1'he Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917, under the terms of which aliens who had declared their intention to become citizens of the United States were subject to military duty, created a situation where the municipal law of the land conflicted with the rules of international law. In conformity with the precedents above cited it was held that the provi-independence according to its own notions of what is right and proper. The statement criticized is perfectly consistent with the internationalistic theory of the conflict of laws/ 43 but not with the fundamental conceptions of law entertained by the courts of England and the United States.
The problem has been discussed so far without reference to our American constitutions. The power of our legislatures and courts in the adoption of the rules of the conflict of laws is actually limited by various constitutional provisions,-especially those relating to due process of law and the full faith and credit clause. So far as these have been or may be held to recognize the theory that rights arising out of acts or transactions without a state are the product of the exclusive operation of a particular law territorially governing the place where the operative facts occur, such theory is binding, of course, on principles of constitutional law. As all constitutional limitations are, however, in reality an integral part of the law of each state, it is therefore still perfectly accurate to say, even with respect to the law of the United States, that all rights are created by the forum.
The qualification of legal transactions and the determination of domicil, lex loci contractus, and other points of contact upon which the application of foreign law depends, raises in view of the foregoing developments no problem of any special difficulty. If the conflict of laws of the forum says that the law of the decedent's domicil governs the distribution of his personal estate it must mean that in the estimation of the forum such rule accords best with the probable expectation of the decedent 144 or with the requirements of a good administration of justice, that is, with the requirements of international social life as conceived by the judge of the forum. A similar reason must underly the adoption of the lex loci contractus in the law of contracts, and all other rules of the conflict of laws.
In the selection of the concept of "domicil", "kt: loci contractus" and the like the courts of the forum might follow one of three conceivable methods. ( 1) They might attempt to find an international concept; (2) they might accept the concept of a foreign country; (3) they might choose the concept of their own municipal law or create one more in accordance with the needs of the case. Practically only the last two methods are available, for ""1 Brinz, Dandektcn (2nd cd.) 104. "'28 Yale Law Journal 814.
